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For Love Or Money? Defining Relationships  
In Law And Life 
Introduction 
Marion Crain  
Kimberly D. Krawiec  
Human life is structured by a variety of relationships, interactions, 
exchanges, and organizations—some are complicated, some are 
simple; some are longstanding, while others are brief; and some are 
memorialized through formal legal agreement or state-conferred 
status, while others remain the product of convenience, habit, or 
social convention. Yet one overriding characteristic by which the 
state, social communities, and individuals categorize human 
relationships and interactions is by distinguishing between those 
arising out of emotion—including love, passion, or altruism and 
those arising from economic expediency or profit-seeking. In other 
words, was the act, relationship, or exchange in question made for 
love (broadly construed) or for money? 
Researchers know that this “love or money” dichotomy is in many 
ways artificial. In the real world, people interact for a variety of 
complex, intermingled, and often contradictory reasons. Many people 
are passionate about their work and love their jobs, yet nearly all 
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enter the labor force and remain employed out of financial necessity. 
Conversely, while marriage is associated in American culture with 
love, many marry or remain married for reasons of social and 
economic advantage. Individuals blur the lines between love and 
money in a host of other ways: we purchase intimacy, 
companionship, and personal services associated with love, embark 
on business and commercial ventures with friends and family 
members, and engage in exchange relationships regarding the most 
intimate aspects of ourselves—our fertility, our children, our bodies, 
our blood—for motivations that appear a combination of altruism and 
profit-seeking. 
Yet once the “love” or “money” labels have attached to a 
relationship or interaction, a variety of personal, social, and legal 
consequences flow from that label. Cognitive dissonance may result 
for an individual forced to consider in “money” terms a relationship 
once in the loving category. Social stigma may attach to those who 
transgress societal conventions regarding which interactions should 
be motivated by love and which by money. Legal disadvantage may 
result to those disempowered by the law’s efforts to maintain the 
divide between love and money. In some circumstances the law 
encumbers or bans outright incursions by money into the realm of 
love. 
Why has the “love or money” distinction been such an important 
and enduring one? To what extent does this distinction reflect reality? 
To the extent that it does not, why do we maintain the dichotomy? To 
further some state interest? The goals of some societal subgroup? Are 
these interests and goals valid ones? Or do they have negative 
consequences? These are the questions addressed by our symposium 
participants. 
In The Complexity of Disentangling Intrinsic and Extrinsic 
Compliance Motivations: Theoretical and Empirical Insights from 
the Behavioral Analysis of Law, Yuval Feldman examines the 
conventional distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations 
for human behavior in social psychology and behavioral theory and 
outlines their complicated interaction. Focusing on law’s role as an 
extrinsic motivator, Feldman explains that extrinsic motivation can 
reinforce intrinsic motivation by expressing social norms which in 
turn influence behavior, or undermine intrinsic motivation through a 
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“crowding out” effect. Reasoning from empirical data, Feldman 
argues that legal policy-making should take into account these 
behavioral realities by attending to how legal incentives are framed, 
how closely the legal instrument is tailored to individual intrinsic 
motivation, whether legal intervention functions similarly to 
monetary incentives and penalties in the particular context where it is 
applied, and the role that legal uncertainty plays. Feldman concludes 
that the intrinsic and extrinsic behavior categories echo the love or 
money divide, and that disentangling them is difficult but nonetheless 
important for effective legal interventions. 
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff responds with a focus on how 
corporate behavior is motivated. She suggests that Feldman’s 
emphasis on the roles of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
complicates questions of motivation in the legal context. At least 
where deterrence is the goal and corporate actions are the target, she 
observes, concerns regarding crowding out are moot. She contends 
that the dichotomous categories of extrinsic and intrinsic behavior 
have little utility in the abstract, and argues for consideration of 
multiple motivations and their behavioral effects regardless of their 
origin. She proposes reframing the motivation analysis to consider 
not only which legal incentives are most likely to deter violators, but 
also which nonmonetary goals victims may have: a desire to receive 
an apology, for example, or an interest in fair process and public 
denunciation. 
In Does Profit-Seeking Rule Out Love? Evidence (or Not) From 
Economics and Law, Julie A. Nelson argues that, though many 
believe that firms are driven by both economics and law to maximize 
profits, these views are mistaken on both fronts. Indeed, she 
contends, the profit-maximization assumption represents not merely a 
myth, but a self-fulfilling prophecy. To the extent we preach that 
firms must profit maximize because it is their purpose, “we 
undermine the very social values that we may believe we are 
defending.” What should be feared, she concludes, is not the simple 
entry of “money”—prices, money, or market relations—into 
significant personal and social relationships, but the entry of narrow 
profit-maximization norms that reduce the value of everything to its 
contribution to the bottom line. 
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In Capturing the “And:”, William W. Bratton agrees with 
Nelson’s conclusions: corporate law does not now nor has it ever 
required shareholder maximization. Indeed, Bratton argues that 
corporate law could not require maximization even if it tried. Instead, 
corporate law can only facilitate profit maximization, by freeing 
firms to attempt to maximize the value of what they produce. 
Bratton’s primary focus is a related question raised by Nelson’s 
project: why did profit-maximization come to dominate American 
thinking about firms in the first place? He contends that, though the 
writings of Adolf Berle continue to be invoked as support for 
modern-day shareholder primacy arguments, these invocations rest 
on a misunderstanding of Berle’s theories. Bratton concludes that 
even the financial crisis was an insufficient shock to challenge the 
entrenched profit-maximization norms described by Nelson. 
In Working Relationships, Laura Rosenbury considers the 
significance of social ties at work. Rosenbury points to the legal 
dichotomy between intimacy (experienced at home or within the 
family unit) and production (the purpose of paid employment), which 
closely tracks the love/money divide. The law’s insistence on this 
dichotomy causes it to miss the noneconomic functions of 
relationships at work, and seems particularly perplexing in light of 
the common historical roots shared by family law and work law. 
Rosenbury argues that law’s failure to attend to the workplace as a 
site for intimacy has important ramifications for antidiscrimination 
goals, in particular. At present, workplace intimacy is both potentially 
under-regulated (favoritism based on friendship networks is generally 
not actionable, for example) and over-regulated (through sexual 
harassment law, which sweeps broadly in the area of sexual 
interactions at work). Rosenbury sketches an agenda for legal reform 
that draws upon social science literature to ground a functional 
approach to relationships that is more attentive to the role of 
networks of care and intimacy at work, oriented toward advancing 
workplace equality, and less bounded by the preconceived nature or 
situs of the relationships.  
Ethan Leib affirms the importance of employment as a site where 
intimacy forms, agreeing with Rosenbury that law’s fixation on 
gender hierarchy and sexual harassment is an incomplete response to 
the dilemma presented by homophily (the tendency to prefer those 
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who are similar to ourselves along racial, gender, religious, national 
origin, or sexual orientation axes) in social networks at work. Leib 
discusses empirical research which suggests that individuals are more 
likely to perceive coworker interactions as transactional, perhaps 
because forces such as law or culture influence our understanding of 
intimacy as linked to context. Leib argues that a range of intimacies 
are likely operating at work, and that consideration of context is 
critical. Moreover, the shifting and permeable boundaries of the 
workplace present challenges to any effort to erect a taxonomy of 
workplace intimacies, and may have important legal ramifications. 
For example, supportive work networks exist even when workers 
employed by other entities, such as competitors, suppliers or 
distributors. Leib embraces Rosenbury’s agenda for reform and 
emphasizes the need for specificity and practical guidance, standards 
and rules. 
In Arm’s-Length Intimacy: Employment as Relationship, Marion 
Crain argues that work law’s frame of employment as an arm’s-
length, impersonal, cash-for-labor transaction ignores the realities of 
dependence and investment that characterize employment for most 
workers. The consequences of this frame are experienced most 
keenly at termination: with no requirement of notice, no transitional 
period and limited income support through the unemployment 
insurance system, workers are cast adrift when they are terminated, 
even if the termination is through no fault of their own. Crain 
contends that work law’s blindness to the intimacy inherent in many 
employment relationships is unsustainable. Crain looks to family 
law—particularly the law of marital termination—for an alternative 
model that challenges the love/money dichotomy, and proposes 
development of a status-based general law of relationship 
termination. The practical effects of this shift might include a 
requirement of notice and transitional assistance at discharge linked 
to longevity of employment and investment; recognition of and 
compensation for the emotional harm linked to termination; and even 
the recognition of property rights for workers in collectively created 
assets. 
Scott Baker responds with a critique rooted in economic theory. 
Baker challenges Crain’s assumption that employers possess the bulk 
of the bargaining power in the employment relation, suggesting that 
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her analysis overlooks the ways in which employees exploit the 
relationship-specific investments made by employers. Worrying that 
Crain’s proposal would increase labor costs, prompting employers to 
substitute capital investment for labor and reducing overall 
employment, Baker argues for a more symmetric analysis that would 
create protections for employers where employees quit without notice 
or cause. Baker also questions the frequency of arbitrary discharge—
is the problem of sufficient magnitude to justify the administrative 
costs of regulating it? Finally, Baker critiques Crain’s suggestion of a 
general theory of recovery for relationship-specific investments, 
pointing to pragmatic difficulties in limiting its application and 
raising slippery-slope objections. Should every relationship be 
subject to notification-of-termination requirements, Baker asks? 
Baker concludes by defending the differential treatment of marriage 
and employment relationships at termination. 
In Enforcing Bargains In An Ongoing Marriage, Mary Anne Case 
notes that courts are generally unwilling to enforce bargains within an 
ongoing marriage, in contrast to their increasingly receptive approach 
to the enforcement of contracts within other long-term sexual 
relationships. Case argues that the U.S. courts are an appropriate 
forum for the enforcement of bargains within an ongoing marriage 
because, if the courts are closed to such couples, they will look 
elsewhere for an authority to intermediate their disputes. Those 
authorities, such as religious bodies or individual clergy, may have 
views about appropriate gender roles within marriage that are limited 
within the U.S. courts by constitutional protections, such as the ban 
against slavery and the guarantees of equal protection and due 
process.  
In response, Robert A. Pollak employs a critique of economic 
models of bargaining behavior to argue that, though enforceability of 
contracts within an ongoing marriage may improve upon the “love it 
or leave it” rule condemned by Case, the magnitude of the 
improvement would likely be small. Pollak argues that relevant 
economic models overstate the likelihood of inefficiency in the 
absence of contractual enforcement because they fail to account for 
three less costly and more effective mechanisms: internalized norms, 
self-help, and non-legal third-party help. Economic bargaining 
models also tend to ignore inefficiencies in the legal enforcement of 
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bargains in an ongoing marriage, including enforcement costs, the 
relational nature of such contracts, and the reluctance of family 
members to enter into contracts. As a result, he argues, Case’s 
proposal is likely to involve only an incremental improvement over 
the status quo. 
In Incorporating The Hendricksons, Larry E. Ribstein argues that 
recent proposals to apply the business associations model to domestic 
relationships risk undermining the integrity of both business 
association law and family law, because the two types of 
relationships differ in significant respects. These differences, Ribstein 
contends, relate to the separation between the individual and the 
organization, the trust and confidence among the members, and the 
broader social effects of governing the organizations. Ribstein 
concludes that there are some similarities between the business 
association and the family in basic function—each deal with long-
term human relationships and the agency, opportunism, and other 
problems arising from such dealings. But the differences are many, 
suggesting that the law should provide for multiple forms in each 
category, while maintaining a separation between business and 
familial standard forms. Though the law should not seek to preclude 
any ultimate convergence of business and domestic standard forms as 
social conceptions of those entities change over time, “distinct 
standard forms should facilitate but not drive these social judgments.” 
Robert C. Ellickson agrees with Ribstein’s conclusion that a direct 
transplant of forms between the business and domestic domains is 
unwise, but contests Ribstein’s prediction that the two types of forms 
may ultimately converge, should conceptions of marriage change 
significantly over time. Relying on Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, Ellickson argues that lawmakers should strive, not for more 
standard forms, but for an optimal number of standard forms. This 
optimal number would provide transactors a range of choices, 
without unduly increasing information costs. Ellickson concludes that 
marriage as an institution is currently desired by a wide range of 
adults seeking to enter unconditional trusting relationships that 
provide a robust form of social insurance and a mechanism for child 
rearing. He predicts that the demand for the marital standard form 
will endure, making convergence with business forms unlikely. 
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In Testing as Commodification, Katharine Silbaugh argues that 
debates within the standardized testing literature represent a split 
similar to the one witnessed in traditional debates on the 
commodifying effects of market exchange: those who extol the 
virtues of a common metric by which to make comparisons and 
evaluations, on the one hand, versus those who argue that test scores 
have swallowed other notions of the public good in education, on the 
other. Silbaugh concludes that “from the comparison we draw 
cautionary notes for the testing movement, areas for further research 
about motivation in behavioral science, and translation of a 
philosophical debate into practical policy.” 
Kieran Healy responds in Counting and Commodifying, posing 
three possible responses to the article: first, that testing is not really 
commodification; second, that perhaps testing is not as bad as 
Silbaugh suggests; and, finally, that it may be mistaken to envision 
certain subjects and practices as intrinsically unquantifiable. While 
the first two responses are critiques of the article’s central claims, the 
third suggests that the problem identified is even more general than 
Silbaugh implies. Healy concludes that the problems Silbaugh 
identifies are not market-like flaws caused by the recent introduction 
of standardized testing, but rather are “well-known features of 
bureaucratic administration.”  
Kimberly Krawiec also responds to Silbaugh in The Dark Side of 
Commodification Critiques: Politics & Elitism in Standardized 
Testing, arguing that, though the testing-as-commodification analogy 
is imperfect, it shows more than Silbaugh acknowledges. Whereas 
Silbaugh concludes that her comparison demonstrates the failure of 
standardized testing, Krawiec contends that it primarily demonstrates 
the politically driven and elitist nature of much of the standardized 
testing debate. She concludes that commodification objections long 
have held an elitist flavor and—because they are more likely to 
resonate with audiences than narrower appeals to self-interest—have 
been invoked for political gains. If standardized testing debates bear 
similarities to market commodification debates, it is only natural, she 
argues, that the parallels extend to these traits as well. 
In “Money Can’t Buy Me Love:” How Sex Therapy Became a 
Commodity in the Age of Viagra, Susan Ekberg Stiritz and Susan 
Frelich Appleton explore the evolution of sex therapy, arguing that 
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the initial promise of transformative and liberatory practices that 
would shape egalitarian sexual expectations and practices ultimately 
morphed into the commodification of sexuality and the affirmation of 
male dominance. As modern medicine co-opted sexual dysfunction in 
order to market a variety of prescription drugs such as Viagra and 
Flibanserin (the pharmaceutical industry’s attempt at female Viagra), 
“money”—in the form of a push toward corporate profits and global 
marketing—once again triumphed over “love” and relationships. 
Stiritz and Appleton conclude that Viagra has been embraced by our 
culture because it fits into the phallic fantasy model that dominates 
the culture, at the expense of a truly mutual sexuality grounded in 
relationships. 
Adrienne Davis speculates on the intriguing questions raised by 
Stiritz and Appleton’s essay, wondering about their implications for 
cultural understandings of sexual politics. For example, what does it 
mean to frame a sexual practice as erotic? Are some forms of 
eroticism more legitimate than others? Davis observes that Stiritz and 
Appleton’s analysis implies that medically-enabled erections are 
illegitimate, at least as contrasted with erections that are “earned” 
through the currency of an interpersonal relationship. What, then, of 
singles or the disabled—do they have a right to the erotic? And what 
about inegalitarian erotic practices: how should we distinguish the 
erotic from the desired, the sexual, or even the pornographic? Finally, 
Davis asks, is there a right to an erotic life? If so, how should we 
understand it?  
In short, whether turning their lens on corporate motivations, 
workplace practices and relationships, family law principles, 
educational testing, or sex therapy, our symposium authors 
encountered the ubiquitous love-or-money dichotomy. Some 
embraced the dichotomy as natural and logical, while others 
criticized it as a product of social construction that reinforces existing 
power differentials or fails to reflect behavioral realities. All of the 
essays emphasize the powerful role that law plays in reifying the 
love/money distinction, a story which is both familiar and 
simultaneously hopeful for legal policymakers interested in the 
possibilities for legal reform. 
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